纽约时报：十问中国预备领导人习近平 (附英文原文）

作者：沈大伟
（DAVID SHAMBAUGH,乔治华盛顿大学伊理亚德国际关系学院中国政策项目的主任）
原载：《纽约时报》2012-02-14

华盛顿——未来一周，中国副主席习近平将造访华盛顿，这提供了一个独一无二的机会，让我们对这位将在未来十年领导中国的人有所了解。

自从2007年习近平被钦点成为胡锦涛的继承者之后，他已经去过世界多地，而在这段预备期内，他还未访问过美国（早先他倒是作为一名省内官员访问过美国。）

对习近平来说，这会是一个好机会来熟悉熟悉美国，反之亦然。在中国之外，他的知名度不高，即使是在国内，他也显得神秘莫测，观察者们会很期待借机一探习近平的国内和国际方向的蛛丝马迹。

以下是中国观察者们希望向习近平了解的十个问题：

• 1.习近平是否会让中共重返政治体制改革之路？

自2009年末，共产党大步倒退——停止并彻底扭转了由习近平前任曾庆红所领导的改革。习近平是否能抵挡得住强大的阻碍改革的保守机构——国家安全机构、军队、党的宣传体系和大型国有企业——或者他会象胡锦涛一样对它们感恩戴德？象李源潮、汪洋、薄熙来、王沪宁和刘延东这样的改革者是否会和习近平一起在10月的18届党代会上升为政治局常委？

• 2.习近平和下一届总理（据说，有两名副总理级别的竞争者，李克强或王岐山）能不能把"平衡"经济的说辞落到实处？

过去两年，许多官员公开呼吁中国应减少对出口贸易和沿海地区的依赖，转为更依靠内地和国内消费，以此作为新的更有持续性的发展模式。至今投资的实情还不匹配这一说法。

• 3. 对西藏和新疆，习近平是否有能力制定出更加人性化的政策？这些地区的种族骚乱自2008年以来逐渐上升，最近几周达到高潮。

国家安全部队使用重型武器对付上述地区的骚乱，造成了人员死亡和广受瞩目的不稳定。需要新的更温和的处理方式了。习近平是否有足够的政治力量对抗压制性机构，并创造条件，让动荡的少数族裔和汉人政府之间能更平稳地共处。

• 4.习近平和党的机构是否能勒住民族主义的缰绳？民族主义在推动着政府在领土纠纷上采取极端立场，要"对抗"美国，还在国际上摆出咄咄逼人的架势。

• 5.针对主流媒体、社交媒体、互联网和教育机构受到的严格控制，习近平是否有足够的自信进行全面松绑？

• 6.习近平是否有能力驾驭军方？近年来军方表现出对中国的邻国主动挑衅这一令人担忧的趋势，并且，似乎军方可以不受文职党领导的控制独立行动？

• 7.习近平是否能制定实质性的外交政策，而不是仅仅口头上的外交辞令？

中国外交的陈词滥调越来越令人起疑，险境重重的世界需要北京投入实际的行动。习近平2009年底在中央党校讲话明确批评，在国内和外交政策空喊口号没有用，要以实际的行动取代空话，这让人寄予希望。

• 8.非洲、中东地区、拉美国家对中国那种掠夺性的、物质化的能源、国际援助和贸易政策越来越不满，习近平会如何应对？

• 9.习近平和中国政府是否将在世界事务中开始扮演更积极、更有建设性的角色，而不那么被动和碍手碍脚？中国会不会继续在联合国安理会站在俄罗斯的一边，反对西方主要国家对叙利亚和伊朗的制裁，成为麻烦而不是解决之道？

• 10.习近平是否胸怀战略远见，愿意投资于推进美中关系？

今天，世界上没有比中美关系更重要的双边关系了，但两国之间仍弥漫着战略性不信任。推进中美关系需要中国的下一代领导人及美国总统的积极参与，才能在两国间建立战略互信。

如习近平的访美不大可能为以上十个问题提供答案，时间将做出回答，他会是一名在国内外都欢迎并创造正面变化的"转型式"的领导人，亦或只是另外一个不敢冒险的职业党徒？

【原文】

Ten Questions for China's Heir Presumptive

The visit by China's vice president, Xi Jinping, to Washington this coming week offers a unique opportunity to take the measure of the man who will lead China for the next decade.

While Xi has traveled the world since being anointed Hu Jintao's designated successor in 2007, he has not been to the United States during this grooming period (he did visit earlier as a provincial official).

This will be a good opportunity for Xi to familiarize himself with America and vice versa. As he is not well known outside of China and enigmatic even inside the country, observers will be looking for clues to Xi's domestic and international orientation.

Here are 10 questions China watchers would like to know about Xi Jinping:

1. Will Xi return to a politically reformist path for the Chinese Communist Party?

Since late 2009, the party has retrenched significantly — halting and rolling back reforms by Xi's predecessor, Zeng Qinghong. Can Xi stand up to the powerful conservative institutions that have blocked reforms — the state security apparatus, the military, the party propaganda system and large state-owned enterprises — or will he be beholden to them, as Hu Jintao has been? Will reformers such as Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, Bo Xilai, Wang Huning and Liu Yandong be promoted to top Politburo positions along with Xi at the 18th Party Congress in October?

2. Can Xi and the next prime minister (the contenders are reportedly Vice Prime Ministers Li Keqiang and Wang Qishan) turn the rhetoric of economic "rebalancing" into reality?

Many official speeches have been made over the past two years calling for a reorientation of the economy away from the export sector and the coastal regions to domestic consumption and the interior as the basis for a new and more sustainable growth model for China. To date the reality of investment has not matched the rhetoric.

3. Will Xi be able to devise a more humane policy toward Tibet and Xinjiang, where ethnic unrest has steadily risen since 2008 and has spiked in recent weeks?

Government security forces have responded with a heavy hand, resulting in loss of life and heightened instability. A new, softer approach is needed. But will Xi have the political strength to stand up to the repressive apparatus and put in place conditions for a more stable coexistence between restive ethnic groups and the Chinese state?

4. Can Xi and the party apparatus reign in the nationalism that is pushing the government to take extreme positions on territorial disputes with China's neighbors, to "stand up" to the United States and behave aggressively internationally?

5. Will Xi be sufficiently confident to all the relaxation of tightened controls on mainstream media, social media, the Internet and educational institutions?

6. Can Xi rein in the military, which has demonstrated a worrisome tendency in recent years to undertake actions that provoke China's neighbors and, seemingly, act independently of civilian party control?

7. Will Xi authorize a foreign policy that is more about substance than rhetoric?

China's diplomatic platitudes have become increasingly incredulous in a dangerous world where real action is needed from Beijing. One hopeful indicator in this regard is a speech Xi gave at the Central Party School in late 2009, in which he explicitly criticized the pervasive tendency toward sloganeering in domestic and foreign policy, arguing that slogans needed to be replaced by substance and hard work.

8. How will Xi handle the growing discontent across Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America over China's rapacious and mercantilist energy, aid and trade policies?

9. Will Xi and the Chinese government begin to take more active and less passive, more supportive and less obstructionist, roles in global governance? Will China continue to stand with Russia in the United Nations Security Council against the will of the majority of other nations on issues like Syria and Iran — and become part of the solution instead of part of the problem?

10. Will Xi have the strategic foresight to invest in advancing the relationship with the United States?

There is no more important relationship for either country in the world today, yet strategic mistrust permeates the current relationship. Advancing the relationship requires the active engagement of China's next leader — and the American president — to build strategic trust between the two great nations.

As Xi's visit is not likely to provide answers to these 10 questions, time will tell if he is a "transformational" leader who embraces and shapes positive changes for China at home and abroad, or whether he is another risk-averse apparatchik.